INTRODUCTION
About the only thing that all of the Supreme Court Justices agreed upon in the recent Bush v. Gore 1 decision was the proposition that, as a general rule, federal courts should defer to state courts on matters of state law. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, stated that "[i]n most cases, comity and respect for federalism compel us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law." 2 The separate dissenting opinions contain similar language, with Justice Stevens calling such deference a "settled practice," 3 Justice Ginsburg gift, 9 and generation-skipping 10 taxes, the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) incorporates state law rather than creating a federal rule to control the federal tax result. This creates a situation unique to the tax area in which a party obtains a state court decree on an issue of state law and later invokes the decree in federal court litigation involving a federal tax issue that turns on the application of that state law. The question thus is how much deference the federal court should give to the state court's interpretation of state law.
Unlike the situation in Bush v. Gore, where the United States Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, most of the state court decisions at issue in subsequent federal tax litigation involve decisions of lower state courts. Yet the same principles of "comity and respect for federalism" support giving deference to lower state court interpretations of its own laws. In the parallel context of the Erie doctrine, 11 where the federal courts apply state substantive law for claims brought in federal court based solely on diversity jurisdiction, only decisions of the state's highest court are binding on the federal court. In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 12 the Supreme Court applied Erie principles in holding that federal courts must give "proper regard" to decisions of lower state courts in subsequent federal tax litigation. Although the Bosch "proper regard" standard in theory appears 4. Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) . 5. Id. at 133 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 6. Id. at 148 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) . 7. E.g., I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) (1994) (income tax deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses disallowed for bribe, kickback, or other payment that is illegal under state law).
8. E.g., I.R.C. § 2053(a) (1994) (estate tax deduction for funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims against the estate, and unpaid mortgages permitted if these items are allowable by state law).
9. E.g., I.R.C. § 2514(d) (1994) (exercise of power of appointment to create another power of appointment is treated as a deemed gift for gift tax purposes if, under applicable state law, the second power can be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of any interest in the property subject to the first power for a period ascertainable without regard to the date of the creation of the first power).
10. E.g., I.R.C. § 2652(c) (1994) (person not treated as having interest in trust for generationskipping tax purposes merely because income or corpus of trust could be used to satisfy person's obligation of support under state law).
11. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) . 12. 387 U. S. 456 (1967 consistent with the Bush v. Gore deference principle, this Article demonstrates that federal courts in practice have given "no regard" to lower state court decisions by concluding in over one-half of the cases applying Bosch over the past thirty-four years that the state court judge had misapplied state law. The Article argues that the federal courts should return to the Erie roots of the "proper regard" test in order to give effect to the Bush v. Gore deference principle. Part I reviews the pre-Bosch confusion regarding how much deference federal courts should give to prior state court decisions in federal tax litigation. Federal courts used and advocated a wide va riety of approaches during this period, none of which properly accommodated the underlying revenue and comity interests. Part I then turns to the Bosch decision and the original promise of the "proper regard" standard as a way to balance these competing concerns.
Part II explains how in practice federal courts have converted this "proper regard" deference standard into a de novo standard of review. Over one thousand federal court cases have cited Bosch over the past thirty-four years, and courts in a clear majority of those cases in which the taxpayer was involved in prior state court litigation have refused to follow the state court's interpretation of state law in the federal tax proceeding. As a result, the federal courts, in practice, have converted the "proper regard" standard into a license to give "no regard" to state court decisions on state law.
Part III discusses the recent Bush v. Gore decision and argues that it is inconsistent with this "no regard" approach. The enormous interest generated by the Bush v. Gore decision makes this a particularly propitious time to rethink this nettlesome question of federal tax law.
Part IV argues that the Erie doctrine provides the best vehicle for reconciling Bosch with Bush v. Gore. The complete -deference approa ch originally embraced by the Supreme Court and recently resurrected by commentators exalts the Bush v. Gore comity interest at the expense of the federal revenue interest. The nonadversary proceeding test adopted by the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) and commentators in recent years inevitably degenerates into a pointless inquiry into the requisite degree of adversariness necessary to make a lower state court decision on state law controlling in subsequent federal tax litigation. Procedural devices such as federal court certification of state law questions to state courts and joinder of the Service in the state court action also do not provide a workable solution to this intractable problem. This Article rejects the "no regard" approach in the existing case law and instead contends that a federal court should apply the same standard of review to a state court decision as would have been applied had the decision been appealed in the state court system. This "bottom-up" approach is consistent with recent cases and commentary on the Erie doctrine. This revitalization of the "proper regard" standard allows federal courts to protect the federal revenue interest without undermining the comity concern by allowing state courts, in most situations, to be the final arbiter of state law. Only in the rare tax equivalent of the Bush v. Gore case should federal courts step in and overturn a state court's application of state law.
I. THE BOSCH STANDARD IN THEORY
I have argued elsewhere 13 that determination of the appropriate amount of deference that federal courts should give to prior state court decisions in tax litigation requires the balancing of competing revenue and comity concerns.
14 Where the Code incorporates state law, there is a federal revenue interest in ensuring that the state law is correctly applied. This view led an early commentator to argue that federal courts should give no deference to state court interpretations of state law; 15 however, a federal court has never explicitly adopted this approach. 16 In contrast, in 1916, the Supreme Court, concerned about the comity interest later highlighted in Bush v. Gore, 17 gave complete deference to lower state court decisions in later federal tax litigation in Uterhart v. United States.
18 Two decades later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue and balanced the revenue and comity interests through a focus on the nature of the state court proceeding.
In set forth a detailed list of factors that would make a state court proceeding sufficiently "collusive" to enable a federal court to substitute its own view of state law for that of the state court. The result was thirty years of confusion in the lower federal courts as they struggled to define "collusion." After initially equating collusion with fraud, 21 many courts subsequently permitted federal courts to re-examine state court interpretations of state law that were the product of nonadversary proceedings. 22 But the courts again did not agree on the factors to be used in making this determination. 23 For example, in some cases, 24 but not others, 25 the init iation of the state court action after commencement of the federal tax controversy was evidence of nonadversariness. Similarly, the lack of notice to the Service of the state court proceeding sometimes, 26 but not always, 27 supported a finding of nonadversariness. Other federal courts focused on such factors as the lack of briefing or a hearing in the state court, 28 or the failure to call witnesses or to conduct cross-examination.
29
The federal courts thus were mired in confusion. Neither the no-deference 21. See Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 223-25 (3d Cir. 1955 'r, 12 T.C. 483, 496 (1949 'r, 12 T.C. 483, 496 ( ), aff'd per curiam, 183 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1950 [VOL. 79:749 nor the complete-deference approaches permitted consideration of both the revenue and the comity interests. Although the nonadversarial approach in theory purported to balance these interests, in practice it degenerated into confusion over the appropriate indicia of nonadversariness. The Supreme Court took another stab at clearing up the confusion in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch.
30
The Bosch case involved the validity under state law of a wife's inter vivos partial release of a testamentary general power of appointment, which converted it into a special power of appointment.
31 If the release was invalid under state law, the husband's estate would get the benefit of the marital deduction because the wife would have received a life estate coupled with a general power of appointment.
32 But if the release was valid under state law, the husband's estate would not get the benefit of the marital deduction. While the case was pending in Tax Court, the executor of husband's estate obtained a state court ruling that the release was invalid under state law. 33 The question thus was whether the federal courts should defer to this state court ruling.
The Tax Court characterized the lower federal courts' approach after Freuler and Blair as "highly confusing" and refused "to underta ke a comprehensive analysis of all of the cases in this field and to attempt to find a rationalization among them which the appellate courts themselves have been unable satisfactorily to do." 34 Although the Tax Court did not consider itself "bound" by the s tate court decision, the Tax Court "accept[ed]" the decision.
35
A divided Second Circuit panel affirmed. The majority held that because there was no evidence of fraud, the state court litigation conclusively established the state law issue for federal tax purposes.
36 Judge Friendly 30. 387 U.S. 456 (1967) . 31. Id. at 457-58. Prior to the release, the power was a general power of appointment because a wife could exercise it on behalf of anyone she wished (including herself, her creditors, her estate, or the creditors of her estate). After the release, the power was a special power of appointment because she no longer could exercise it on behalf of herself, her creditors, her estate, or the creditors of her estate.
32. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1994). 33. Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009 , 1010 -11 (2d Cir. 1966 ), rev'd, 387 U.S. 456 (1967 . According to the state court, a donee of a power of appointment could not release the power under state law if the donee was unable to exercise the power at that time. Because the power was a testamentary power of appointment, the state court held that a wife's release of the power in an inter vivos instrument was invalid. See id. at 1011-12 n.3 (reprinting entire state court opinion).
34. Estate of Bosch v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 120, 122-23 (1964 ), aff'd, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966 ), rev'd, 387 U.S. 456 (1967 dissented, chastising the Supreme Court for not having addressed this "important problem" for nearly thirty years. 37 He noted that the "cryptic character" of the Court's "dated pronouncements" had caused widespread confusion in the circuits over this "intractable" problem. 38 Judge Friendly stated that the problem had been "bedeviled by iteration of terms such as 'collusive' or 'non-adversarial.' To require proof of collusion in the normal sense of prearrangement would impose a nigh impossible burden on the Commissioner; yet a court shrinks from using such an opprobrious epithet when no prearrangement has been shown. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the "widespread conflict among the circuits." 45 In its brief, the Service argued that the Court should adopt the nonadversary proceeding test to balance the competing revenue and comity interests. 46 According to the Service, permitting federal courts to reexamine a state court's interpretation of state law only in the case of fraud slights the revenue interest; federal courts would have "too narrow" a role if taxpayers could arm themselves with a state court ruling on state law and, in the absence of fraud, "eliminate the role of the federal courts in adjudicating federal tax controversies." 47 Conversely, the Service argued that embracing a pure Erie approach would implicate comity concerns; federal courts would have "too broad" a role if a taxpayer would have to press his state law position "to the highest State appellate court if he is to foreclose the possibility that a federal court will tax him as if he had lost the State proceeding." 48 Instead, the Service argued that the federal courts should be permitted to re-examine the state law issue whe re the lower state court decision was the product of a nonadversary proceeding. 49 The executor contended that this nonadversariness standard was administratively unworkable and would violate the comity concern by permitting "unnecessary intrusions" by federal courts into state court determinations of state law.
50
Justice Clark, writing for six members of the Court, rejected both fraud and nonadversariness as the trigger for a federal court's re-examination of a state court's interpretation of state law. The majority instead seized on a statement in the legislative history of the marital deduction at issue in the case that "'proper regard,' not finality, 'should be given to interpretations of the will' by state courts." 51 The majority also quoted the portion of the legislative history that required the state court interpretation to be the product of "a bona fide adversary proceeding." 52 But in offering general guidance on the question of the degree of deference that federal courts must give to state court interpretations of state law in subsequent federal tax litigation, the majority made clear that "proper regard," and not nonadversariness, would be the future touchstone:
[U]nder some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling. It follows here then, that when the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of a state trial court as to an underlying issue of state law should a fortiori not be controlling. This is but an application of the rule in Erie, where state law as announced by the highest court of a state is to be followed. This is not a diversity case but the same principles may be applied for the same reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on state law and the State's highest court is the best authority on its own law. If there be no decision by that court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving The Court remanded the case to allow the Second Circuit to determine whether the wife's partial release was valid under state law, after giving "proper regard" to the lower state court's decision. 54 However, the Court did not provide any guidance on the meaning of the term "proper regard."
There were three separate dissenting opinions in Bosch. 55 Justice Douglas argued that, absent fraud, lower state court decisions on state law should control subsequent federal tax litigation. 56 In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan embraced the Service's proposed nonadversary proceeding test as the appropriate way to balance the competing revenue and comity concerns.
57 Justice Harlan's dissent provides the intellectual foundation for the Service's current position on the appropriate deference to be given by federal courts to state court decisions on state law as well as for commentators who advocate abandonment of the majority's "proper regard" approach.
Justice Harlan noted at the outset of his dissent that the question of the weight to be given a state court decision in subsequent federal tax litigation was "doubly important: it is a difficult and intensely practical problem, and it involves basic questions of the proper relationship in this context between the state and federal judicial systems. 57. Justice Harlan also criticized the majority's focus on the "proper regard" language in the legislative history of the marital deduction at the expense of the "bona fide adversary proceeding" language. Id. at 475 n.3. Justice Harlan contended that this language was "broadly consistent with virtually any resolution of these issues, but it is difficult to see the pertinence of the sentence's last four words if, as the Court suggests, conclusiveness was intended to be given to the State's highest court, but to none other." Id. Justice Harlan argued that neither Justice Douglas's fraud standard nor the majority's "proper regard" standard "satisfactorily reconciles the relevant factors involved." 62 The fraud standard slighted the revenue interest because it created excessive risks that federal taxation will be evaded through the acquisition of inadequately considered judgments from lower state courts . . . brought, in reality, not to resolve truly conflicting interests among the parties but rather as a predicate for gaining foreseeable tax advantages, and in which the point of view of the United States had never been presented or considered.
63
The "proper regard" standard slighted the comity concern because it required "federal intervention into the administration of state law far more frequently than the federal interests here demand," thereby destroying both "the proper relationship between state and federal law and . . . the uniformity of the administration of law within a State." 64 Instead, Justice Harlan identified the federal revenue interest as a narrow one: to obtain "a considered adjudication of the relevant state law issues."
65
The federal revenue interest in such a "considered adjudication" could be satisfied through a lower state court's decision if it was the product of an adversary proceeding. 66 However, if the state court proceeding was nonadversarial, the revenue interest could be protected only through a federal court's re-examination of state law.
67 Although Justice Harlan did not "define with any particularity" the weight to be given to various factors in determining whether the state proceeding was adversarial, he did provide several illustrative factors. Justice Harlan conceded that this approach lacked the precision of Justice Douglas's fraud approach and of the majority's "proper regard" approach, but argued that it reflected "more faithfully than either of those resolutions the demands of our federal system and of the competing interests involved." REV. 940 (1989) . See also infra note 96 for a discussion of the impact of the "case-selection effect" on the empirical results reported in this Article.
73. The precise percentage of cases reaching this result probably is less important than the federal courts' adoption of de novo review in the face of the " proper regard" standard. This is true in part because of the relatively small number of relevant cases and the lack of a comparative yardstick of results in other areas in which a federal court must rule on the correctness of a state court's application of state law in a case involving a party to the federal proceeding.
74 741, 744-45 (1972); Harris v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1165 , 1177 -79 (1971 ), rev'd, 477 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1973 Willits v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 602, 617-18 (1968); Smith v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 273, 281-83 (1968 ), aff'd, 418 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1969 89. This lack of respect is especially troubling given the evidence in the Erie context illustrating how often federal courts incorrectly gauge state law. See, e.g., Jerome I. Braun, A Certification Rule for California , 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 935, 937-40 (1996) STUD. 233 (1996) . As a result, even a pro-taxpayer legal standard would not result in a trial success rate much different than fifty percent because most such cases would be settled in the taxpayer's favor; only the close questions on both sides of the standard would remain for trial. Although the taxpayer's forty percent success rate in requiring the Service to follow a state court's prior application of state law despite the Bosch "proper regard" standard would appear to support the case-selection effect thesis, the basic assumption of the case-selection effect theory undercuts its application here. The case-selection effect theory depends on the parties being able to predict the outcome of litigation under a legal standard in deciding whether or not to settle. However, as this Article has demonstrated, the Bosch standard has engendered thirty-four years of disarray, as the federal courts have read all meaning out of "proper regard." By paying lip service to this standard, but then subjecting lower state court determinations of state law to de novo federal review, the federal courts have undermined the parties' ability to correctly gauge the result of litigation. This is especially true in light of the federal courts' sporadic reliance on the pre-Bosch nonadversary proceedings test and the uncertainty faced by the parties under both the Bosch standard and the separate state law issue. In these circumstances, the case-selection effect does not offer a convincing explanation for the results of the empirical research reported here.
97 Gore. Yet the same principles of comity and federalism at the heart of Bush v. Gore support federal courts giving deference to a lower state court interpretations of its own laws. This notion is reflected in the language of the Justices' separate opinions re-stating the deference principle in the broadest possible terms to encompass decisions of not only the highest state court but also lower state courts.
Moreover, the enormous visibility of the Bush v. Gore decision makes this an especially propitious time to re-think this nettlesome aspect of federal tax law that has bedeviled courts and commentators for decades. With both the legal community and the public now more attuned to the comity issues implicated by federal judicial intervention into state court decision making, 112 federal courts no longer should be able to blithely convert the Bosch "proper regard" standard into a one-sided embrace of the federal revenue interest through their no regard approach. To that effect, there are various alternative ways to implement the Bush v. Gore deference principle, either within the existing Bosch framework or through an entirely new approach. There are several possibilities for injecting the Bush v. Gore comity concern back into the Bosch "proper regard" framework: (1) requiring federal courts to defer to all state court determinations of state law in subsequent federal tax litigation; (2) requiring federal courts to accept only state court determinations that are the product of an adversarial proceeding; or (3) using procedural devices such as certification and joinder. This section argues that none of these approaches adequately balances the competing concerns and that federal courts instead should return to the Erie underpinnings of the Bosch standard to give effect to the Bush v. Gore deference principle. 107, 117 (2d Cir. 1988) . Although the Second Circuit questioned whether the Service was "allocating wisely the time and effort of its limited staff" in pursuing the matter, it concluded that the Service had a "legitimate purpose" for issuing the summonses to investigate the circumstances of the expenses. Id. at 117-18. The case thus involved the narrow context of a summons enforcement proceeding, but the estate in its certiorari petition cast the issue in broad Bosch terms as "the degree of deference owed by the federal tax authorities to determinations by state courts." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 4, White v. United Stat es . After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, White v. United States, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989) , and heard oral arguments in the case, the Court, with Justice White dissenting, dismissed the writ of certiorari as having been "improvidently granted." White v. United States, 493 U.S. 5 (1989). The case apparently had become moot as the Service had obtained the information it requested in the summonses, and a year later the Service agreed to refund the entire amount of estate tax attributable to the disputed deductions. 117 Gilbert Verbit has recommended that federal courts return to this complete-deference approach:
A. Complete Deference
This Uterhart rule should replace Bosch as the method of dealing with state court decisions in federal tax cases. In short, all final decisions of state courts should be accepted as binding in federal tax cases, regardless of the level of the state court or the character of the proceedings in that court.
118
The difficulty with this approach is that it exalts the Bush v. Gore comity interest at the expense of the legitimate federal interest in protecting federal revenues against aberrant manifestations of state law. Although Professor Verbit refuses to view state court judges as active participants in a "Great Treasury Raid," 119 requiring federal courts to give controlling weight to all state court decisions would eliminate any role for federal courts in ensuring the correctness of state court interpretations that control federal tax liability. Moreover, it would create an incentive for taxpayers to manufacture state court litigation in order to come within the protection of this rule. 120 Instead, the question is how to afford meaningful federal supervision of state law without running afoul of the Bush v. Gore deference principle as is currently the case with the Bosch "proper regard" standard. This approach is misguided for several reasons.
B. Deference to State Court Adversarial Proceedings
As explained earlier, 127 the federal courts in the pre-Bosch period were unable to agree on the set of relevant factors to determine whether the state court proceeding was sufficiently adversarial so as to bind the federal court. Although Justices Harlan and Fortas tried to supply such a list in their Bosch dissents, any such effort is doomed to fail because of the inherent nonadversarial nature of most of the state court proceedings at issue in subsequent federal tax litigation.
128
Moreover, giving controlling status only to adversarial state court proceedings encourages the taxpayer's counsel to engage in elaborate "pillow fights" and other machinations designed to produce the requisite adversity.
129
The adversarial approach is fundamentally flawed because it generates controversy and litigation over a peripheral issue rather than what should be the focus of the inquiry: the correctness of the state court's application of state law. As I have noted elsewhere, why should a state court's erroneous application of state law control the federal tax result merely because the state proceeding "was cloaked with sufficient indicia of adversariness?"
130
Professor Wolfman took me to task for "ignor[ing] the fact that it is always the business of courts, particularly federal courts deciding tax cases, to look under cloaks, to see through even elaborate facades to the structure ( 131 Substance-over-form considerations undeniably are endemic in the tax law, 132 but there is simply no reason to lard yet another tax area with these uncertainties when there is a better alternative described in Part D of this section.
133

C. Procedural Devices
The Bosch "proper regard" standard and the "total regard" and adversarial approaches thus do not adequately protect federal and state interests in giving effect to state court decisions in federal tax litigation. This section examines procedural devices such as certification and joinder and concludes that they too fail to protect these interests.
Certification
One way to obviate the thorny issue of the degree of federal deference owed to lower state court determinations of state law is to have the federal court certify the state law issue to the highest court in the state. 134 Under Erie , decisions of the highest state court would be controlling in the federal tax litigation. 135 REV. 649, 657-58 & nn.53-54 (1999) .
143. See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974) (footnote omitted) ("We do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law and where certification procedure is available, resort to it is obligatory. It does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism. Its use in a given case rests in the sound discretion of the federal court."); Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 775 n.7 (10th Cir. 1999). 
773
Moreover, many state certification procedures provide various limitations on the types of questions they will answer, 144 do not permit certification from federal trial courts, 145 and retain discretion to refuse to answer p articular questions. 146 In addition, a growing number of judges 147 and commentators 148 question the desirability of the widespread use of certification. In any event, any attempt to make certification mandatory would raise serious constitutional concerns. 149 But the foremost barrier to the routine use of certification in the Bosch context is that most of the fact-bound state law questions at issue in federal tax litigation are not appropriate candidates for certification. 150 As the Seventh Circuit observed, "fact specific, particularized decisions that lack broad, general significance are not suitable for certification to a state's highest court." 
Joinder
Commentators who advocate a return to the complete-deference 152 and adversariness 153 approaches couple these standards with a requirement that the Service be given notice of, and the opportunity to appear in, the state court proceeding. Indeed, joinder of the Service as a party in the state court proceeding would serve both the revenue and comity interests.
154 Joinder would allow the Service to litigate the state law issue in state court, but then res judicata and collateral estoppel principles would bar it from re-litigating the issue in federal court. However, there are both practical and theoretical difficulties in joining the Service as a party in the state court proceeding.
The Service's long-standing policy is not to appear in state court litigation involving state law issues that may bear on the taxpayer's federal tax liability. 155 The Internal Revenue Manual 156 sets forth specific guidelines for dealing with state court litigation "[i]n a Bosch type of case":
157 the Service will not respond to notice about the state court action, 158 will decline attempts by the taxpayer to have the Service intervene in the state court action, 159 will decline service of process in the state court action, 160 and will seek to have itself dismissed as a party if it is successfully served in the state court proceeding.
161
The Service's reluctance to appear in state court is understandable in the context of most state court proceedings vis-à-vis the later federal tax proceeding. At the time of the state court litigation, the federal tax issues often have not yet ripened. In the estate tax context of Bosch litigation, the state law issues are decided in state probate proceedings, which typically 
D. A Return to Erie Principles
As noted earlier, 164 the Court in Bosch explicitly relied on the Erie doctrine as the foundation for the "proper regard" test. 165 Indeed, it is wellsettled that although the Erie doctrine arose in the diversity context, it also operates in nondiversity cases whenever federal law incorporates state law as the applicable rule of decision.
166 Courts and commentators have gone awry in failing to give sufficient weight to the Erie underpinnings of the Bosch "proper regard" standard.
The Court has consistently identified the "twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of the inequitable administration of the [state's] laws." 167 The current practice of federal courts giving mere lip service to the Bosch "proper regard" standard in concluding in over one-half of the cases that the state court judge had misapplied state law contravenes both of these aims. This failure to adhere to the Bush v. Gore deference principle discourages the use of state courts to resolve issues of state law and undermines the ability of state courts to administer the laws of 162. See, e.g., Christopher Bergin, IRS Audit Rate Takes Another Dramatic Drop, 90 TAX NOTES 982 (2001) , 143 F.3d 995, 1001 , 143 F.3d 995, (5th Cir. 1998 , 143 F.3d 995, ), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1072 , 143 F.3d 995, (1999 .
166. See, e.g., DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 n.13 (1983) ("[W] here Congress directly or impliedly directs the courts to look to state law to fill in details of federal law, Erie will ordinarily provide the framework for doing so."). See generally Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH . L. REV. 311 (1980 ). 167. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965 . See also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996); Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988 Mitchell Gans argues that Erie simply is "not relevant" in the Bosch situation.
168 According to Professor Gans, concerns about forum shopping are misplaced because "federal tax disputes are resolved only in the federal courts."
169 But where the federal tax result turns on the application of state law, the choice of whether to litigate the state law issue in state or federal court is undeniably affected by the degree of deference afforded the state court determination by a federal court. Professor Gans also contends that Bosch's reliance on Erie cannot be justified by a concern about federal courts trampling on state law: a federal court resolving a tax dispute does not, by determining a state -law issue in the course of reaching its ultimate tax conclusion, trample upon state law in the same way that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction might were it permitted to disregard state-court decisions.
170
But as explained below, the different procedural postures of the typical Erie and Bosch cases suggest that there is a greater violation of the Bush v. Gore comity concern whe n federal courts trample upon state law in federal tax litigation.
171
The proper resolution of this nettlesome issue of tax law thus should accommodate the procedural differences between the garden-variety Erie and Bosch cases. 172 In the traditional Erie diversity case, the question is the weight to be afforded in the federal proceeding to state law determinations by lower state courts in cases involving other parties. In contrast, in the typical Bosch tax case, the question is the weight to be afforded in the federal proceeding to a state law determination by a lower state court in a case involving the taxpayer. Implementation of the Bush v. Gore deference principles requires a careful consideration of the competing revenue and comity interests.
On the one hand, the revenue interest supports giving less deference to prevent the taxpayer from manipulating the state proceeding to obtain a state law ruling with favorable federal tax consequences not otherwise permitted under state law. On the other hand, the comity interest supports giving more 168. Gans, supra note 120, at 891 n.83. 169. Id. 170. Id. 171 . Bernard Wolfman criticizes the Court in Bosch for "its simplistic, forcible co-opting of Erie doctrine." Wolfman, supra note 124, at 2-6. Professor Wolfman argues that the differences between the Erie and Bosch contexts support a return to the adversariness approach. Id. at 2-7 to 2-8.
172. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 526 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ill. 1988); Sidwell v. Griggsville Cmty. Sch. Dist. 4, 566 N.E.2d 838, 840 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Bradshaw v. Pellican, 504 N.E.2d 211, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987 571, 573, 578-81 (1979) . In addition, if only one district of the intermediate appellate court has decided a state law issue, a trial court located in another appellate district is bound by that decision. See, e.g., People v. Thorpe, 367 N.E.2d 960, 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) .
177. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 68 F. Supp. 2d 983, 986-87 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Murry v. Sheahan, 991 F. Supp. 1052 , 1053 -54 & 1054 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1998 Applied Micro, Inc. v. SJI Fulfillment, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 750, 755-56 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 538-45 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641, 643-45 (N.D. Ill. 1982 183 Geri Yonover agreed that the "top-down" approach is more consistent with Erie principles. 184 Like Judge Posner, Professor Yonover based her argument on Bosch in concluding that the "top-down" approach avoided having the federal court apply "a rule different from that which would ultimately be applied in state court."
185 Although Chief Judge Posner and Professor Yonover correctly conclude that the "top-down" approach better accommodates Erie in the non-Bosch setting where there was no prior state court litigation involving the parties, the "bottom-up" approach better serves Erie principles where the taxpayer was a party in the prior state court litigation.
In the Bosch situation, federal courts should give the same deference to the lower state court decision as would be given to it on appeal in the state 186 The proposed "bottom-up" approach will implement the Bush v. Gore deference principle and result in more deference being given by federal courts to state court determinations of state law than is currently the case under the Bosch "proper regard" standard. Although the precise standard of review will depend on the applic able state law in a given situation, very few of the cases that have invoked Bosch over the past thirtyfour years have presented pure questions of law subject to de novo review in the state appellate court. Instead, most of the cases have involved either pure questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law where the state appellate courts would employ a more deferential "clearly erroneous" or "abuse of discretion" standard of review.
For example, in Estate of Goree v. Commissioner, 187 the decedent died intestate in an airplane crash, survived by his wife and three minor children. 188 The principal asset of the estate was $3.9 million of stock in a single corporation. Decedent's father was appointed administrator of the estate, and his wife was appointed conservator of the estates of their children.
189 Under Alabama's intestacy statute, 190 one-half of the estate was to be distributed to decedent's wife and the other one-half divided among the three children, resulting in significant estate tax liability. 191 To prevent these adverse tax consequences, decedent's wife petitioned the Alabama Probate Court to enter protective orders authorizing each child to execute partial disclaimers renouncing any interest in their father's estate in excess of $200,000. 192 The plan thus was to defer the estate tax by having a total of 193 with the remaining assets passing to the wife under the Alabama intestacy statute to qualify for the marital deduction. 194 The Alaba ma Probate Court appointed a guardian ad litem for the children and, after a hearing, approved the disclaimers as being in the best interests of the children under the relevant Alabama statute. 195 The Service disallowed the estate's claimed marital deduction on the ground that the Alabama Probate Court had misapplied the best interests of the children standard in approving the disclaimers. 196 The Service contended that the Tax Court should give no deference to the Alabama Probate Court's decision and instead conduct a de novo review to determine whether the disclaimers were in the best interests of the children under Alabama law.
197
In a memorandum decision, the Tax Court refused to eviscerate Bosch and instead applied the same standard of review that the Alabama Supreme Court would have used had the Alabama Probate Court's decision been appealed in the state court system. 198 Although the lack of a record or transcript of the Alabama Probate Court hearing hampered the Tax Court, 199 the estate presented as witnesses at trial in the Tax Court all of the parties to the probate proceeding, 200 as well as the Alabama probate judge. 201 After hearing these witnesses, the Tax Court held that the Alabama Probate Court's determination that the disclaimers were in the best interests of the children was not "plainly and palpably erroneous" under Alabama law. 202 The Tax Court rejected the Service's argument that the wife's sole motive in seeking approval of the disclaimers was to eliminate the estate tax liability. Although tax considerations clearly were present, the Tax Court pointed to nontax factors, such as the desire to preserve capital and The Service announced that it would not acquiesce in the Goree decision on the ground that "the Tax Court erred in applying an appellate standard of review to a lower state court factual determination instead of revie wing the question de novo." 204 The accompanying Action on Decision, 205 however, is much broader. The Service argued that the Tax Court "misapplied" Bosch because " [t] he cases it cited in support are all distinguishable in that they concern the extent to which lower state court legal determinations are binding on the Tax Court, not factual determinations."
206 This fixation on the distinction between legal and factual determinations misses the mark. Goree is the typical Bosch case in that it involves a state court factual determination that would receive great deference by state appellate courts under the "plainly and palpably erroneous" standard of review. In contrast, state appellate courts only apply the de novo standard of review proposed by the Service to pure questions of state law that are quite rare in the Bosch context. Under the Service's approach, federal courts would give no deference to state court proceedings that lack the requisite degree of adversariness. 207 As I have 203. Id. In an interesting postscript to the case, the estate petitioned the Tax Court to assess attorneys' fees against the Service under I.R.C. § 7430. The estate contended that the Service's position was not "substantially justified" within the meaning of § 7430 because the Service had misinterpreted Bosch in arguing that the Tax Court was required to make a de novo determination of state law. The Tax Co urt rejected the attorneys' fees request, but only because of the lack of a state court record; the Tax Court implied that had such a record existed, the Service's argument for de novo review would not have been "substantially justified":
Respondent's position in the instant proceeding was reasonable, especially in light of the fact that no record or transcript of the Probate Court proceeding was maintained. Although we held in our prior opinion that Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, supra , did not necessarily require us to review the Probate Court proceeding de novo, we conclude that petitioner would not have satisfied its burden of proof in the absence of a record or other evidence of what transpired in the Probate Court proceeding. Had petitioner not offered the testimony of those persons who participated in the Probate Court proceeding at trial, we would not have had a record from which we could decide whether the Probate Court judge's decision to permit the partial disclaimers was plainly and palpably erroneous. We think that even the Supreme Court of Alabama, had it been required to review the Probate Court judge's decision, would have remanded the case to the lower court to make a record sufficient for it to review. Respondent's position in the instant case was reasonable, taking into account the fact that there was no record to support petitioner's position that the Probate Court judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the disclaimers by decedent's minor children. Consequently, we hold that respondent's position was substantially justified. Estate of Goree v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1068, 1069 (1994) .
204. 1996-2 C.B. 1 n.10. 205. Action on Dec. 1996 -001 (Mar. 4, 1996 ), 1996 WL 89733. 206. Id., 1996 212 Yet it offers the best balance of the twin Erie goals of eliminating forum shopping and ensuring effective state court administration of state law. Where, as in Goree, the state appellate court would apply a deferential standard in reviewing the lower state court's application of state law, the federal court should similarly circumscribe its review of the lower state court's decision. Under this approach, the federal court is not free, as is the existing practice under the "proper regard" standard, to disregard the state court's decision and conduct a plenary review of state law. In contrast, a "top-down" approach, which focuses on predicting how the highest state court would decide the case, would provide review not otherwise available in the state court system. This "top-down" approach would interfere with the Erie goal of obtaining the same result in the federal system to minimize forum shopping incentives and preserve the state courts' role in administering the laws of the state.
At first blush, Goree's adoption of the state law standard of appellate review appears inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent embrace, in the diversity context, of a federal standard of appellate review. In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 213 the New York legislature had enacted a statute requiring that state intermediate appellate courts determine whether a jury award was excessive based on whether it "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation." 214 The New York courts had extended this standard to the state's trial courts as well. 215 The issue was whether federal courts in a diversity action should use this New York standard or the more deferential federal standard. 216 The Court balanced the respective state interest (to rein in excessive jury awards) and federal interest (to preserve the jury's role as decisionmaker under the Seventh Amendment) and reached different conclusions with respect to the applicable standard to be applied by the federal district court and the federal court of appeals. 217 The Court held that a federal district court should apply the state's more restrictive standard for trial court review of a jury's verdict, rather than the more deferential federal standard ("shock the conscience"). 218 According to 212. The leading tax treatise first cites the Bosch "proper regard" test and then the Goree bottomup approach, but concludes that "the lower courts have not always been blind to relationships among the litigants in the state court proceedings or the presence of federal tax motives for those proceedings." 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, supra note 132, at 4-15 to 4-16. 213. 518 U.S. 415 (1996) . 214. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995 roughshod over the Bush v. Gore deference principle in concluding in over one-half of the cases that the state court had misapplied state law. In contrast, the "bottom-up" approach would give teeth to the "proper regard" standard by requiring the federal courts to give the same degree of deference to the state court decision that it would have received on appeal in the state court system.
223
The current judicial practice of federalizing questions of state law through de novo re-examinations of state law decisions is contrary to the longstanding probate exception to f ederal diversity jurisdiction. Under this "venerable" doctrine, 224 the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction does not extend to the administration of a decedent's estate or the probate of a will.
225
The doctrine is based in part on the greater expertise of state judges in dealing with these issues compared to their federal counterparts.
226 Even though most of the Bosch issues arise in the estate administration and probate context, federal courts have used the "proper regard" standard to oust their state counterparts in interpreting state law.
227
The "bottom-up" approach also accommodates both the revenue and the comity concerns. Federal revenue interests are protected by permitting meaningful review of the state court's application of state law. Comity concerns are protected by limiting federal review of the state court decision to the same standards that would have been applied by the state courts on appeal of the original decision.
The "bottom-up" approach may not strike the ideal balance between federal and state interests in every situation. But the burden in these situations is for Congress to re-calibrate the respective roles for federal and state law under the particular federal tax provision. For example, Mitchell Gans has convincingly argued that various provisions of federal tax law either under-emphasize 228 or over-emphasize 229 state law. He contends that 223. In the rare case where the Service makes "defensive" use of a lower state court determination that would have adverse tax consequences for the taxpayer if followed in the subsequent federal tax litigation, the bottom-up approach again would require the federal courts to give the same degree of deference to the state court decision as it would have received on appeal in the state court system. 224. Turja v. Turja, 118 F.3d 1007 (4th Cir. 1997 230 Absent such re-calibration in specific situations, the "bottom-up" approach is the best way to balance the twin Erie goals, the Bush v. Gore deference principle, and the revenue and comity interests.
CONCLUSION
For eighty-five years, the federal courts have been unable to agree on how much weight should be given in federal tax litigation to a state court's determination of state law. The focus on the general question of federal court deference to state court decisions in Bush v. Gore should be directed at finally resolving this nettlesome federal tax question. The only approach that gives fealty to the Bush v. Gore deference principle, while also furthering the goals of the Erie doctrine and balancing the competing revenue and comity interests, is for federal courts to afford the same degree of deference to the state court determination as it would have received on appeal in the state court system. As a result, federal courts no longer should treat the Bosch "proper regard" test as a roving license to second-guess state court determinations of state law. Instead, it should take the rare tax equivalent of the Bush v. Gore situation to impel a federal court to overturn a state court's application of state law. . I part company with Professor Gans over his suggestion that a "more modest" solution to the marital deduction's over-emphasis of state law would be for Congress to overrule Bosch by statute. Id. at 891 n.83 & 931-33. Since Bosch has widespread impact in the federal tax law beyond the marital deduction, overruling the decision to solve a problem with the marital deduction would be throwing the baby out with the bath water. Moreover, Professor Gans' suggestion that Bosch could be replaced by having federal courts either giv e complete deference to state court decisions or give deference only to state court decisions that are the product of adversarial proceedings ignores the
